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ecurities markets depend on data. In the absence of data, it is not possible to under-
write risk, and judgments about risk are crucial to securities pricing. This essay 
discusses the sort of data that would be necessary to make underwriting decisions 
for community development funding.
In principle, it is possible to securitize anything. Securities based on underlying real goods 
go back at least as far as the development of modern futures markets for commodities with the 
opening of the Chicago Board of Trade in 1848. In particular, farmers at the time they planted 
their crops wanted to have confidence in the price that they would receive when they sold 
their crops. Even in the absence of price fluctuations, farming was and remains a risky busi-
ness. Farm output was determined in part by farmer effort, but also by climate and insects. 
In light of their production risks, farmers looked to shed at least price risk, and so the 
commodity futures market was born. Securities markets help complete markets: they allow 
investors with different risk tolerances to share risk, and they allow capital markets to fund 
all manner of economic activity. As such, economists have some confidence that securities 
markets are generally welfare improving.
This essay will discuss the extent to which securities markets may be used to fund idiosyn-
cratic community and mixed-use development. It begins by describing the more “old-fash-
ioned” model for financing projects: bank, or more generally, depository, based finance. It will 
discuss both the benefits and pitfalls of such a financing system, and how it came to be largely 
replaced, at least in the conventional conforming mortgage market, by a securitized system.
It then discusses the securitized model, and the strengths and weaknesses of that model. 
Finally, it speculates on the data requirements for developing a securitized model of commu-
nity development, and whether such requirements are feasible.
The Banking Model
Let us take a very brief time to describe how a bank finances local development projects. 
Banks have short term liabilities (deposits) which are used to fund loans. Banks are not 
allowed to lend all their funds available—they must also keep capital. Banks earn profits on 
the spreads between their loans and their cost of funds; the cost of funds is the weighted 
average of returns to depositors (i.e., deposit rates) and returns to capital (which may be 
thought of as the difference between required return on equity and a safe rate, such as a short 
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Banks must concern themselves with three things beyond the spread: default probability 
and severity, default volatility, and capital requirements.1 The impact of default probability 
is obvious: for banks to profit on a loan, it must earn a greater spread if it considers default 
probability to be high. Moreover, if a project has a, say, 20 percent probability of default and 
a 20 percent loss severity, it is difficult to make it feasible under any circumstance. There is 
also a point at which the spread required to compensate for risky loans is so high that, by 
itself, it makes the loan riskier.
Modern computing has allowed banks (and other financial institutions) to correlate 
default probabilities in some circumstances. For example, models can predict default prob-
abilities on conventional conforming mortgages with some accuracy. But for more compli-
cated types of loans, the available models are still somewhat rudimentary, in part because of 
the data issues that we will discuss later in this essay.2 In the absence of models, bankers rely 
on judgment in “estimating” default probabilities for various types of mortgages. This may 
be why banks shy away from unconventional projects. In the absence of experience with such 
projects, bank loan committees decide that discretion is the better part of valor and pass up 
the opportunities to fund what may be economically positive projects.3
Beyond default, volatility of default is an issue. For a particular loan, a five percent default 
probability does not translate into every loan going five percent bad—it rather means that 
individual loans go bad five percent of the time. Imagine for a moment that twenty banks 
each hold one loan. Nineteen will be fine, but the one that is stuck with the bad loan might 
well go out of business. If one bank owns all twenty loans, though, risk becomes manageable, 
as the level of losses becomes more predictable. Thus large banks serve some similar func-
tions to securities—they diversify risk, and as such make loss prediction more certain.
The third concern facing banks is capital. In part because bank deposits are backed by 
the U.S. government, banks are required to hold capital, and the level of capital they are 
required to hold is a function of the riskiness of the portfolio of loans.4 When banks invest 
in securities such as AAA Corporate Bonds and agency backed mortgage backed securities, 
banks only need to hold 1.6 percent capital (assuming they are above the minimum capital 
requirement). But when banks make whole loans to businesses, they must hold eight percent 
capital. Thus by regulation, business loan and community development loan funding is 
more expensive than other types of investments for banks. Recent events in the subprime 
1  When banks were local institutions, capital requirements were a more serious impediment, because the flow 
of capital came from a limited area. Now that banks are national and even international institutions, this has 
become less of an issue.
2  In a recent paper, Y. Liu, G. Jabbour and R. Green, “The Performance of Option-Based Default Risk Models on 
Commercial Mortgages: An Empirical Investigation,” Journal of Fixed Income, (Fall 2007), discuss the problem of 
developing default probability models for commercial real estate.
3  To use the parlance of capital budgeting, banks do not always fund positive Net Present Value projects.
4  There are two types of capital requirements: minimum capital and risk based capital. For a bank to be 
considered well capitalized by the Federal Reserve Board, it must have five percent minimum capital and eight 
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and commercial paper markets suggest that these regulatory requirements are entirely appro-
priate, but they also tend to discourage banks from making unconventional loans.
Before we begin discussing securitization, however, it is worth discussing three advantages 
banks have relative to securities markets: local and personal expertise, servicing, and flex-
ibility. All of these things actually relate to one and other.
We begin with local expertise. Consider a loan for the purpose of developing a retail 
center in an area in, say, Lodi, that is on the border between improving and deteriorating. 
It will be difficult for an investment analyst in London or Tokyo or San Francisco to make 
a judgment about likelihood of success or failure. It is probably also not worth the analyst’s 
time to get on an airplane, and meet the series of people she would need to meet in order 
to make a judgment. A banker in the community may well be in a better position to make 
a judgment about whether a loan will fly or not. Note that part of the issue here is a lack 
of systematic data about the characteristics that help predict the path of a community’s 
economy—let alone how a particular project might affect that path.
Second is the issue of servicing. This is an issue that has risen to prominence in the wake 
of the subprime crisis. Banks have an incentive to service their problem loans, because each 
dollar they lose on a loan is a dollar lost by their shareholders. As we shall discuss below, 
the financial issues of servicers and securities holders in the subprime mortgage market have 
often diverged from each other. Servicers are paid a fee conditional on default, but not a fee 
that is perfectly correlated with loan performance. Among other things the subprime crisis 
has taught us is that servicers do not have the infrastructure in place to deal with mass fore-
closures, in part because they do not have an incentive to invest in such infrastructure.
Third is flexibility. Often it is the case that when a loan goes sour, it is better for both 
borrowers and lenders to do a workout, which can include payment extensions, re-amorti-
zation, rate changes, and haircuts. Because banks live and die with their loans, they cannot 
focus on the sunk cost of their loans, and negotiate terms on problem loans in a forward-
looking manner.5 Clearly, good servicing practices and flexibility are connected.
Securities
In at least one lending market in the United States, securities have taken substantial 
business away from banks: the residential mortgage market. Figure 1, which is based on the 
Federal Reserve Board Flow of Funds data, shows how depositories’ share of residential mort-
gages has fallen precipitously.
5  A paper by T. Riddiough and S. Wyatt “Wimp or Tough Guy: Sequential Default Risk and Signaling With 
Mortgages,” Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Special Issue on Information and Screening in Real 
Estate Finance, vol. 9 (November, 1994 ): 299-321, though, shows that sometimes banks have an incentive to 
be tough on their borrowers because of reputational issues: they are better off losing more money that they 
might on an individual loan in order to maximize returns over a total portfolio of loans.Community Development INVESTMENT REVIEW
























Until the 1980s, commercial banks and savings and loans financed about three-quarters 
of the mortgages in the United States. They now fund about 30 percent. The difference was 
funded by Government Sponsored Enterprises (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac), which issued 
guaranteed securities or purchased loans for their own portfolios, and by the “private-label” 
mortgage backed securities market.6
There were three precipitating events that led to the spectacular growth in securitization. 
First, as Figure 2 shows, the yield curve turned sharply negative. This essentially took deposi-
tories out of the mortgage game. Short term funds (such as deposits) were more expensive 
than long-term funds (such as mortgages), so spreads on existing books of business became 
negative, which led, among other things, to insolvency for many savings and loans. For 
investors who did not hold short term liabilities, however, the prospect of holding long term 
mortgages that might guarantee long term returns was attractive.
6  Also Ginnie Mae, which purchases FHA and VA mortgages. Ginnie Mae securities are backed by the full faith 
and credit of the US Government.Community Development INVESTMENT REVIEW
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Second,  Freddie  Mac  invented  an  ingenious  instrument,  the  Mortgage  Participation 
Certificate. This financial innovation allowed mortgage originators and savings and loans to 
package mortgages into a security and sell pieces of the security to investors. This allowed 
(relatively) small investors to purchase effectively small shares of large numbers of mortgages, 
and as such, produced diversification benefits.
Third, and most important to the ultimate discussion of this paper, was that Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac’s special status enabled them to have the market power necessary to impose 
standardization on the mortgage process and on mortgage documents. This produced a trove a 
data that became the underpinning of the modern residential mortgage underwriting system.
All who apply for a conventional conforming loan—one that is eligible for purchase by 
Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac—fill out the same set of forms. The appraiser that they use to 
estimate the value of the house also fills out a specific form. This means that every loan 
purchased by the GSEs has a set of measurable characteristics.7 Among the most impor-
tant of these are loan-to-value ratio, FICO scores, and payment-to-income ratio. Fannie and 
Freddie then develop models based upon millions of loans to determine the relationship 
between loan characteristics and default and delinquency rates. For a loan to qualify for a 
Fannie or Freddie pool, it must generally have a very low predicted probability of default.
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The homogeneity of collected GSE loan characteristics essentially makes GSE mortgage 
backed securities commodities, and so they trade in highly liquid markets. This homogeneity 
is almost certainly among the reasons that spreads on conventional conforming loans have 
not risen much during the subprime crisis.
It is here that the contrast with subprime loans is pronounced. Subprime loans are 
heterogeneous, in part because many of them were poorly documented.8 To get around this 
problem, investment banks created complicated securities structures whereby investors who 
wanted to reduce risk would get paid first (and take a lower coupon) while those who had 
a greater appetite for risk would get paid later. The problem was that because the subprime 
market was relatively new, and sometime sparsely underwritten, investors were really oper-
ating in an environment of uncertainty, rather than risk.
There is an important lesson here as we contemplate securitization for such things as busi-
ness loans, economic development loans, community reinvestment loans, and so on: it may 
be the case that for a securities market to be successful, the object being securitized should 
likely be homogeneous.9
A Securities Market for Community Development Loans?
The lynchpin of securities markets is modeling.10 For example, in the residential mort-
gage backed securities market (at least that part of the market that is not currently in crisis), 
underwriting decisions are based on dichotomous choice models: models in which a set of 
variables is used to predict a dichotomous outcome, such as delinquency and nondelin-
quency, or default and nondefault. These models are usually based on normal or logistical 
distributions: models based on the normal distribution are called “probits,” and those on the 
logistical are called “logits.”
To demonstrate how they work, let us look at residential mortgages. Mortgage compa-
nies, such as Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Citibank and Wells Fargo, observe performance on 
millions of mortgages. They investigate how a set of variables predicts mortgage default: the 
most important variables are loan-to-value ratio, borrower credit history, and payment to 
income ratio. Statistical models then place weights, or coefficients, on these characteristics 
to produce predicted likelihood of default (LTV and borrower credit history get particularly 
substantial weights). Lenders then choose a cut-off point for acceptable default probability. 
8  There were also clear instances where adverse selection issues contributed to loan heterogeneity. 
9  By this I mean a debt market—equities are a completely different issue.
10 A classic work on credit modeling is D. Duffie and K. Singleton (2003), Credit Risk: Pricing Measurement and 
Management. Princeton University Press. In the mortgage context, works of particular note include J. Quigley 
and R. Van Order (1995), “Explicit Tests of the Contingent Claims Model for Mortgage Default,” Journal of 
Real Estate Finance and Economics, 11(2): 99-117. For a different view on default, see: J. Kau, D. Keenan and 
T. Kim (1993) “Transaction Costs, Suboptimal Termination and Default Probabilities”, Real Estate Economics, 
21:247-263 and J. Kau, D. Keenan and T. Kim, (1994) “Default Probabilities for Mortgages”, Journal of Urban 
Economics, 35:278-296. 
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The cut-off point is not zero—loans with some probability of default can still be expected 
to be profitable. Lender determination of the cut-off point is based in good part on risk 
tolerance—very conservative lenders will accept a lower default probability than more risk-
loving lenders.
The reason these models underpin securities is that they allow for the sort of homo-
geneity necessary to commoditize the mortgages inside the security. While no model can 
predict the performance of an individual mortgage, it can be the foundation for accurate 
prediction of a pool of mortgages. We can make an analogy with life insurance. No model 
can predict whether an individual will die in a given year, but a model can do a very good job 
of predicting the share of the population that will die within a given year.
In principle, one could imagine developing a similar model for community development 
loans. Again, lenders would be seeking a model that could predict default; then they would 
pick a cut-off point. Because such a model does not so far as I know exist, one would have to 
begin with a set of variables presumed to be important. These would include:
(1)  Some measure of the track record of the developer. This would be analogous to a 
borrower’s credit history. A development company such as the Rouse Companies 
or Forrest City Development might get a very high score; a company that has no 
track record at all might get a low score.
(2)  A loan-to-cost ratio. Because community development projects have difficult-to- 
project  income,  about  the  only  measure  of  value  available  for  underwriting  is 
construction cost. Alas, costs can diverge dramatically from value—an uninhabited 
building can cost a lot of money to build and have no value. Still, a low loan-to-
cost ratio implies lots of developer equity in a project, which is a powerful signal. If 
nothing else, high levels of developer equity reduce moral hazard.
(3)  Some measure of community trajectory. These could include:
a.  Changes in Income
b. Changes in Population
c.  Changes in Education Levels in the Population
d. Changes in Local School performance
(4)  Ideally, there would also be an indicator of “payment-to-income.” In commercial 
real estate, this is called the debt cover ratio, which is net operating income divided 
by debt-service payment. This reflects the cushion that commercial projects have to 
meet their mortgage obligations. The problem, of course, is that it may be difficult 
to project income for new types of projects in communities without a track record 
of commercial rent levels.
One could think of other potential characteristics, but these are sufficient to make the 
point about the difficulty of developing a securities market for community development. 
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high scores to developers with strong track records and low scores to developers with little 
experience. It does not particularly matter what score we choose, because the purpose of 
econometric modeling would be to calibrate the arbitrary score to loan performance.
The difficulty is with the developers who have good but not sterling track records. How 
would we know who they are? How do we assign them scores? Again, to some extent econo-
metric modeling can produce calibration, but as the first models are created, it will be neces-
sary to assign arbitrary scores to developers, and those scores will be based on some sort of 
ad hoc judgment. We could make similar points with respect to the other variables.
But let us say we can solve the problem of measuring meaningful characteristics. The 
development of a securities market for community development loans faces two major 
impediments. First, to have a useful market, underwriting documents for community devel-
opment loans would need to become standardized and data on the performance of loans 
would need to be collected. This would require cooperation among the various loan origina-
tors in the business. Note that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were able to impose standard-
ization because they had market power that derived from their special status. In the absence 
of such institutions, it is not entirely clear what the mechanism would be that would lead to 
standardization.
The second impediment is the reality of the current market for securities. For investors to 
be comfortable with something new and unusual, they would need to have confidence in the 
evaluation of a rating agency. It is an understatement to say that the investment community 
lacks that confidence at the moment.
Moreover, the recent subprime crisis produces an interesting question: can investors a 
long distance away from a deal invest in heterogeneous products? Banks, who would have 
a better ability to evaluate an unusual deal, would have every reason to finance those that 
they find better than average while passing on those that they find worse than average. This 
means that the only deals that would be left for the securities markets would be those with 
difficult-to-measure unfavorable characteristics.
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